NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 41 | Number 4

Article 14

6-1-1963

Insurance -- Contribution Rights under G.S. §
1-240
John Bryan Whitley

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John B. Whitley, Insurance -- Contribution Rights under G.S. § 1-240, 41 N.C. L. Rev. 882 (1963).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol41/iss4/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 41

consonant with the potential use in light of the surrounding circumstances. 34
In the final analysis the status of the doctrine of acceptance of
dedication by user in North Carolina is confused. The decided cases
have left a wake of conflicting statements and strangely amalgamated
concepts which do not entirely agree with the better reasoned authorities. At least in the context of the principal case, 35 a simple solution
would be to acknowledge that the general public, relying on the
manifested intent to dedicate streets in a subdivision, could make the
offer irrevocable by user without thereby imposing a duty of maintenance on the public authorities.
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.
Insurance-Contribution Rights under G.S. § 1-240
Of extreme practical importance to the practicing bar is the contribution statute, G.S. § 1-240,1 around which a maze of questionable procedural rules has been judicially constructed.' Considerable
"E.g., Dormont Borough Appeal, 371 Pa. 84, 89 A.2d 351 (1952) (use
only by residents of immediate neighborhood, insufficient acceptance by general public).
" The finding of an incomplete dedication in the principal case may well
have been supportable on the facts, even if the court had recognized user as
a mode of acceptance. Even so, it would seem that a discussion of user and
the weighing of the factors that combine to determine whether there has
been sufficient user was necessary to correctly reach the final result.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953) provides in effect that "(1) those who
are jointly and severally liable as judgment debtors, either as joint obligors
or as joint tort-feasors, may pay the judgment and have it transferred to a
trustee for their benefit, and such transfer shall have the effect of preserving
the lien of the judgment against the judgment debtor who does not pay his
proportionate part thereof to the extent of his liability; (2) joint tort-feasors
against whom judgment has been obtained may, in a subsequent action therefor, enforce contribution from other joint tort-feasors who were not made
parties to the action in which the judgment was taken; (3) joint tort-feasors
who are made parties defendant, at any time before judgment is obtained,
may, upon motion, have the other joint tort-feasors made parties defendant;
(4) joint judgment debtors who do not agree as to their proportionate liability, by petition in the cause, in which it is alleged that any other joint
judgment debtor is insolvent or a nonresident and cannot be forced under
execution to contribute to the payment of the judgment, may have their
proportionate liability ascertained by court and jury; and (5) joint judgment
debtors who tender payment of judgment and demand in writing transfer
thereof to a trustee for their benefit, and are refused such transfer by judgment creditors, may not thereafter have execution issued against them upon
said judgments." Gaffney v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 518,
184 S.E. 46, 47 (1936).
' See 40 N.C.L. Rlv. 633 (1962).
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uncertainty also exists as to the act's current substantive effect, and
legislative revision would seem to be in order.
One important question to be considered if the statute is revised
will be whether to codify or eradicate the present rule recently reaffirmed in Herringv. Jackson3 that a liability insurance carrier may
not be subrogated to its insured's right to contribution against a joint
tortfeasor. This dubious doctrine, peculiar to this state, was announced by our court over twenty-five years ago in Gaffney v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,4 where the original defendant insurer

attempted to implead the joint tortfeasor and his liability carrier.
It was said there that since the right to contribution was purely
statutory in derogation of the common-law rule that joint tortfeasors
had no such remedy, "a most liberal construction of the statute will
not permit the writing into it of the liability insurance carrier of
tort-feasors when only tort-feasors and judgment debtors are mentioned therein." 5 It may well be questioned whether a truly "liberal"
court in that instance would not have written the word "insurers'
into the statute, relying upon the equitable theory of subrogation. .
Other courts have not found themselves incapable of performing this
very task 7 and liability insurance carriers are generally held to be
entitled to such rights without question where they exist in favor
of their insureds. s
'255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961), discussed in Civil Procedure

(Pleading and Parties),Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law,
40 N.C.L. REv. 494 (1962).
209 N.C. 515, 184 S.E. 46 (1936), discussed in 15 N.C.L. REv. 289'

(1937).

A default judgment had been entered and returned unsatisfied

against defendant's insured prior to the action.
rId. at 519, 184 S.E. at 47-48.
' See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
'Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc. v. Zody, 43 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Ky.
1942); State ex rel. McCubbin v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App.
1961); McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121
(1950).
'E.g., Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg Co., 133 Conn. 536, 52 A.2d 862 (1947) ; Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v.
Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421 (1959) ; Leitner v. Hawkins,
311 Ky. 300, 223 S.W.2d 988 (1949) (rule discussed although insured sought

contribution without objection after settlement); Underwriters at Lloyds of
Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926) ; Western Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933).
See also Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, at 1388 (1958 & Supp. 1962); Annot., 171
A.L.R. 271 (1947) supplementing Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1486 (1931).
The UNIFORM CONTRIBuTIO N AMONG TORTFEASORs AcT § 1(e) (1955)
provides: "A liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in
part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's'right of contribution to the
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Apparently defendant insurer in Gaffney did not believe the court
meant what it said, for after satisfying the judgment and causing
it to be assigned to a trustee, the insurance carrier recovered a default judgment against the joint tortfeasor 9 and then proceeded to
sue his insurer for contribution. The theory advanced was that if
G.S. § 1-240 did not confer the right, the equitable principle of subrogation did without regard to the provisions of the statute. A
demurrer was sustained and affirmed. 10
These decisions did not attain their real importance, however,
until the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Acts of 1953 and 1957, providing for compulsory liability coverage.1
The question then arose as to how far these cases extended. The
answer came three years ago in Squires v. Sorahan.12 Judgment had
been entered against four defendants, an agent and his three principals, one of which had left the state and could not be forced under
execution -to contribute to payment. Liability insurers of two defendants satisfied the judgment, one paying five-sixths and the other
the remainder. After having the judgment assigned to a trustee for
the benefit of its insured, the former company in the name of its
insured proceeded by petition in the cause for a judgment establishing the proportionate part each judgment debtor should pay. The
petition was denied. On appeal, counsel for appellant argued that
the earlier decisions were distinguishable in that they merely held
that a liability insurer and its insured, upon paying more than a proportionate share of the judgment, could not go directly against the
insurer of the other joint judgment debtor, and did not rule out an
.action against the latter.' 3 The supreme court disagreed.
-extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share

of the common liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right
.of subrogation arising from any other relationship." HANDBOOK OF T31E
.NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 218
,(1.955).

See note 14 infra.
,Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211 N.C.
13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936), 15 N.C.L. REv. 289 (1937): "There is no relationship between joint tort-feasors which entitles one joint tort-feasor to
contribution from the other joint tort-feasor. Neither is liable as surety for
the other. Each is liable for the damages caused by their joint and concurring
negligence. But for the statute, neither is entitled to contribution from the
Id. at 17, 188 S.E. at 636.
other."
'1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39, 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
12252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960), 12 MERCER L. REV. 276.
x'
Brief for Appellant, p. 17. Counsel for appellant pointed out that the
court had recognized without comment in Lumbermen's Mut.'Cas. Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936), that plain1
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Although producing no substantial change in the North Carolina
law, the Herring decision, because of the particular facts involved,
presented the court with a reasonable opportunity to re-evaluate the
Gaffney rule. In Herring the insured instituted an independent suit
for contribution against the joint tortfeasor after plaintiff's insurance carrier had paid the injured party pursuant to a consent
14
judgment in return for the insured's execution of a "loan receipt.'
Reasoning that the "loan receipt" was merely a subterfuge employed
by the insurer in an effort to circumvent and subvert G.S. §§ 1-57
tiff's action for contribution was grounded on a prior default judgment entered against defendant's insured, establishing his liability as a joint tortfeasor. The argument was also made that the theory of subrogation was
improperly presented in that case because instead of contending that the
insurer was equitably subrogated to the statutory right of contribution, plaintiff there argued that subrogation provided the right without regard to the
statute. Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-16. The court answered that the statute
could not "be stretched to include subrogation, which arises by reason of
contract, into contribution, which arises by reason of participation in the
tort." Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 591, 114 S.E. 2d 277, 279 (1960).
The tenor of the opinion was that the insured was not the real party in interest, but this was not explicitly stated by the court.
" This agreement was in the standard form, stating that the plaintiff
received the sum required to pay the judgment against him from the insurance company as a loan to be repayable only in the event and only to the
extent of any recovery which might be had by the plaintiff from the defendant as a joint tortfeasor. It further provided that the plaintiff agreed
to cooperate fully with the insurer and would allow the suit to be brought
in his name, if necessary, to the end that all right of contribution which he
had or might thereafter acquire could be enforced. Finally, it was provided
that the expense of the litigation, if any, would be borne by 'the insurance
carrier and if an action was brought, it would be under the exclusive control
of the insurance company.
Counsel for plaintiff-appellant, representing insurer and insured, informed
this writer that the decision to bring the loan receipt arrangement before the
court by way of an independent action for contribution in lieu of impleading
the joint tortfeasor as a third party defendant in the claimant's suit was
reached on the basis of the following facts: Claimant and joint tortfeasor
were related and instituted separate suits against the insured in different
counties. It was thought that claimant could prove liability and recover at
least $15,000, but that insured was not liable for the injury specified in the
joint tortfeasor's suit. Also, insured had a substantial claim against the
latter. Hence, settlement was made with claimant for $8,750, the policy
limit being $10,000, and a counterclaim was filed along with the answer to
the joint tortfeasor's subsequent action. The joint tortfeasor failed to establish negligence as the proximate cause of the injury for which he had sued,
the jury apparently choosing to believe that this injury had been received in
a previous accident, but the insured established the joint tortfeasor's negligence and recovered over $4,000 on his counterclaim as to which the joint
tortfeasor had failed to plead contributory negligence. The stage was then
set to test the "loan receipt" in an independent action for contribution since
the issue of defendant's negligence was res judicata under the rule of Stansel
v. McIntyre, 237 N.C. 148, 74 S.E.2d 345 (1953).
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and 1-240, the court held that the settlement represented not a loan
but payment under the policy. Thus, the insurer-not its insuredwas the real party in interest under G.S. § 1-57,'5 and since insurance
carriers have no right of contribution under G.S. § 1-240 as construed, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed."0
No valid quarrel can be made with the unerring logic of the
decision. Many cases have approved the "loan receipt" device as a
means of avoiding subrogation of the insurer and leaving the insured as the real party in interest, but with few exceptions, all
involved claims for damage to the insured's property by fire, collision
or similar casualty allegedly caused by the tortious act of a third
party.' 7 In such situations, the only purpose of a "loan" is to shield
insurance companies from the possible prejudice of jurors, since by
full payment insurers are universally subrogated to their insureds'
rights and may sue in their own names.'" In fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court has said in dictum no less than three times,
including the instant decision, that a "loan receipt" will be respected
in such a situation.' 9
In contrast, the only case20 found allowing an insured to prosecute
a contribution suit for the benefit of his liability insurance carrier
through the use of a "loan receipt" was decided in a jurisdiction
where the insurer, had it chosen, could have sued in its own right. 2'
Since in that decision the sole purpose of the "loan" was to avoid
15 For the
North Carolina rules regarding insurance carriers under G.S.
§1-57, see Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618
(1959) and cases cited therein, discussed in Note, 38 N.C.L. Rnv. 99 (1959).

" Counsel for appellant presented the Herring case by way of hypothetical 1in his brief in Squires and predicted this result.
'E.g., Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918); Capo v. C-0 Two Fire Equip. Co., 93 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.J. 1950);
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952); Green v. Johns, 86 Ga.
App. 646, 72 S.E.2d 78 (1952) ; Klukas v. Yount, 98 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. App. Ct.
1951); Sosnow, Kranz & Simkoe, Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122,
54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945) aff'd iner., 295 N.Y. 675, 65 N.E.2d 326 (1946).
See generally Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1261 (1945), supplementing Annots., 132

A.L.R. 607 (1942) and 1 A.L.R. 1528 (1919).

18 Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952); Service
Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d 879
(1945).
" Herring v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 545-46, 122 S.E.2d 366, 373 (1961);
Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 354, 108 S.E.2d 618, 620
(1959); Cunningham v. Railroad, 139 N.C. 427, 433-34, 51 S.E. 1029, 1031

(1905).

"oBlair v. Espeland, 231 Minn. 444, 43 N.W.2d 274 (1950).
2
Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 209
N.W. 13 (1926).
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jury prejudice, the holding was distinguished, our court reasoning
that since the insurer there could have prosecuted the action itself
had it so desired, the defendant was not adversely affected. In short,
Herring v. Jackson stands for the proposition that a liability insurance carrier cannot create a cause of action in itself through the
use of a "mere fiction." Overall, it is reluctantly conceded that it
was asking too much of the court to overturn the established rule
on the basis of such a fictitious transaction. Plaintiff-appellant might
22
have argued that the insured was the trustee of an express trust

under G.S. § 1-63 or that payment by the insurer was in practical
effect payment by the insured through the premiums, 2' but no author-

ity directly in point could have been cited for either proposition. It
appears safe to say that the court has spoken the final word on this
question, 24 and that any relief from the harshness of the present rule
can only come through the legislative process.
As the law apparently now stands, an insurer must bear the entire
burden if it satisfies a judgment before judgment is entered in favor
of its insured for contribution against the joint tortfeasor; that is,
the liability carrier can preserve its insured's right to contribution
2 Dixey v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 132 F.2d 275 (8th Cir.
1942); Miller v. Pine Bluff Hotel Co., 170 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Ark. 1959);
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952); Sosnow, Kranz & Simkoe, Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122, 54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945) aff'd
inem., 295 N.Y. 675, 65 N.E.2d 326 (1946).
The contention that the insured is the trustee of an express trust, or an
action brought in the name of the trustee after assignment of claimant's
judgment to him would very likely be unsuccessful. The North Carolina
court recently in Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Cas. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 637,
129 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1963), held in effect that the assignee of a judgment,
or the trustee of a judgment debtor, could maintain an independent action

for indemnity against a co-defendant "subject to the rule that the payment

in full by a judgment debtor operates as an absolute discharge of the judgment, notwithstanding that an assignment is made to a trustee to keep it alive,
if the payor is not, aside from the assignment, entitled to contribution, subrogation or indemnity." The court would probably hold that the insurer,
not the insured, was the "payor" under this exception to the rule that the
trustee may sue. Also, plaintiff insured in Herring was really no more than
an agent for collection who cannot qualify as trustee of an express trust.
Martin v. Mask, 158 N.C. 436, 74 S.E. 343 (1912). Finally, the court has
indicated that the same defenses must be available to defendant against either
trustee or his cestui que trust. Mebane v. Mebane, 66 N.C. 334 (1872).
such" aFiorentino
v. Adkins, 154 Atl. 429 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1931); Adams v.
Book, 244 App. Div. 646, 280 N.Y. Supp. 88 (1935).
2 "Manifestly, plaintiff cannot, by the 'device' or 'mere fiction' of a 'Loan
Receipt' agreement or otherwise, confer upon Nationwide a right to contribution when such right is denied by the decisions of this Court." Herring
v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 545, 122 S.E.2d 366, 373 (1961). (Emphasis
added.)
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only by impleading the joint tortfeasor as an additional defendant.
By this procedure, plaintiff's judgment against the insured and the
latter's judgment against the additional defendant for contribution
are entered at the same time, thus preserving the right." The teaching 6f the Gaffney case is that this cross-action must be prosecuted
in the name of the insured. Independent actions and motions in the
cause for contribution after entry and satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment, whether brought by insurer or insured, afford no relief as
shown by the decisions in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., Herring, and
Squires. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find any rational basis for
allowing contribution in the one instance and not in the other. Also,
under the decisions interpreting G.S. § 1-57, if plaintiff's judgment
exceeds the policy limits by the slightest amount, the cause of action
remains in the insured, thus enabling him to bring a subsequent suit
if the
for contribution against the joint tortfeasor" or his insurer,
7
former's liability has been established in a prior action.1
Furthermore, the sole procedural remedy of cross-action is not
always available. For example, if the joint tortfeasor is a large
corporation, wealthy individual, or other so-called "target defendant," counsel for original defendant may decide that forfeiture of
the contribution right is wiser than risking an increased recovery
due to the additional defendant's presence in the suit. Also, when
plaintiff joins all defendants in his complaint, cross-claims for con" Counsel for plaintiff in the Herring case states that there is a strong
belief among many members of the insurance bar that this avenue is also
closed by Herring. At least one insurer of an additional defendant has been
advised not to recognize the judgment for contribution rendered against its
insured, and litigation is expected to follow. The theory is that the original
defendant cannot enforce the judgment for contribution until the plaintiff's
judgment has been paid, and when this payment has been made by an insurer,
the cause of action for contribution no longer resides in the insured but is
extinguished. No case has yet decided this issue. See also Smith v. Whisenhunt, 259 N.C. 234, 130 S.E.2d 334 (1963), where the jury was unable to
reach a decision on the contribution issue, and the court ordered a new trial
on that issue alone.
2 See Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d
618 (1959), and cases cited therein, discussed in 38 N.C.L. REv. 99 (1959).
Suppose the insurer is liable on its policy up to $10,000 and judgment is
entered for $12,000. It would be consistent with the cases discussed in this
note if the insured could only recover $1,000 in contribution from the joint
tortfeasor, but in accord with current real party in interest rules, the insured
may collect $2,000 for himself and $4,000 as trustee for his liability insurance
carrier.
27 Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 129 S.E.2d 222
(1963). Most policies provide that the insurer shall be liable only for those
sums insured is "legally obligated" to pay.
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tribution are not allowed.2" This necessarily means that G.S. §1-240
is completely ineffective as to joint judgment debtors and obligors,
at least in the instance when they are active joint tortfeasors2 when
the judgment is satisfied by the liability insurer or insurers paying
the entire sum or more than their proportionate share or shares.
When G.S. § 1-240 was first enacted in 1929, it amounted to an
announcement of legislative policy favoring contribution.3 ° Considering the fact that nearly all North Carolina motorists now carry
liability insurance, it is evident that the statute retains little of its
former effectiveness. It is often said that if the rule were otherwise
the particular insurer would profit little, since gains from realizing
and losses from paying contribution would probably cancel one
another in a multitude of cases. It would seem, however, that the
validity of this argument depends on whether the different insurance
firms write approximately the same number of policies. Also overlooked is the fact that the absence of the right is reflected in higher
insurance rates, and it is highly unlikely that the insurer will ever
recoup any amount paid in contribution to resident self-insurers and
nonresident motorists who are uninsured. Simply stated, the current rule does not treat the particular parties in the specific suit in
an equitable manner.
It is also safe to assume that insurers are hesitant to settle and
lose their contribution possibilities where there is an honest question
of joint tortfeasorship and where a compromise settlement cannot
be reached with the other carrier. Thus, the no contribution as to
insurers rule runs afoul of the general policy of the law favoring
settlement"1 and frustrates the purpose of the Financial Responsibility
2 Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs, Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82
(1961), criticized in 40 N.C.L. Rv. 633 (1962). Claimants might possibly
utilize this rule as a threat to force settlement.
"A defendant secondarily liable may cross-claim for indemnity against
his co-defendant, who is primarily responsible. Greene v. Charlotte Chem.
Labs, Inc., supra note 28.
" As to the policy of contribution, see the opposing positions of Professors

James and Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic
Criticism; A Defense, 54 HARV. L. Rzv. 1156 (1941).
" It is true that G.S. § 1-240 requires a judgment to support the right to

contribution so that in every instance at least a consent judgment must be
entered. Should the statute be revised, the legislature should seriously consider whether this burdensome condition should be retained. A prior judgment is unnecessary because the identical questions will be in issue and the
same defenses available to the joint tortfeasor in the contribution action.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251
N.W. 491 (1933).
Section 1 of the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTnSORs AcT, set
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Acts, which were enacted for the benefit of the highway victim. The
General Assembly might well consider changing this rule based
purely upon legal reasoning without sufficient regard to practical
considerations.
JOHN BRYAN WHITLEY
Oral Contracts to Devise Realty-Right of Third Party Beneficiary
to Recover on Quantum Meruit
In North Carolina an oral contract to devise real property is
void under the Statute of Frauds,' and part performance by the
promisee will not remove the contract from the operation of the
Statute.2 However, the promisee who performs services pursuant to
such a contract has a remedy on implied assumpsit or quantum meruit
to recover the value of the services rendered.'
Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer4 presented the question of whether
the third party beneficiary of a contract that is void under the Statute
of Frauds may recover on quantum meruit the value of services rendered by the promisee pursuant to the contract. In this case the
father of an illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother
that he would devise and bequeath to the child a one-fifth part of his
estate if she would refrain from instituting bastardy proceedings

out in the HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 218 (1955), provides: "(a) Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, where two or more persons become jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though
(d) A
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of then ....
tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury
or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any
amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable."
(Emphasis added.)
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1953).
2 Duckett v. Harrison, 235 N.C. 145, 69 S.E.2d 176 (1952); Ebert v.
Disher, 216 N.C. 36, 3 S.E.2d 301 (1939); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C.
363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N.C. 9 (1838). Part performance by the promisee will remove the oral contract from the operation
of the Statute in all but three states. E.g., Betterly v. Granger, 350 Mich.
651, 87 N.W.2d 330 (1957); Holt v. Alexander, 207 Okla. 140, 248 P.2d 228
(1952); Patton v. Patton, 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E.2d 849 (1960). See generally RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 197 (1932); 1 PAGE, WILLs § 10.13 (BoweParker rev. 1960).
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Daughtry v.
Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943); Grantham v. Grantham,
supra note 2.
'257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962).

